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By “philosophy of mathematics” I mean the working philosophy of the 
professional mathematician, the philosophical attitude toward his work that is 
assumed by the researcher, teacher, or user of mathematics. What I propose 
needs reviving is the discussion of philosophical issues by working mathe- 
maticians, especially the central issue-the analysis of truth and meaning in 
mathematical discourse. 
The purpose of this article is, first, to describe the philosophical plight 
of the working mathematician; second, to propose an explanation for how this 
plight has come about; and third, to suggest, though all too briefly, a direction 
in which escape may be possible. In summary, our argument will go as follows: 
(1) The philosophical notions about mathematics commonly held by the 
working mathematician are incompatible with each other and with our actual 
experience and practice of mathematical work. Many practical problems and 
impasses confronting mathematics today have philosophical aspects. The 
dearth of well-founded philosophical discourse on mathematics has observable 
harmful consequences, in teaching, in research, and in the practical affairs 
of our organizations. 
(2) The present impasse in mathematical philosophy is the aftermath of the 
great period of foundationist controversies from Frege and Russell through 
Brouwer, Hilbert, and Godel. What is needed now is a new beginning, not a 
continuation of the various “schools” of logicism, formalism or intuitionism. 
To get beyond these schools, it is necessary to go back in history to their origin, 
to see what they had in common, and how they were rooted in the mathematics 
and philosophy of their day. 
(3) Many of the difficulties and stumbling blocks in the philosophy of 
mathematics are created by inherited philosophical prejudices which we are free 
to discard if we choose to do so. Some of our philosophical difficulties will 
then simply evaporate; others will become tangible problems which can be 
investigated systematically, with reasonable hopes for progress. 
Each statement will be amplified and argued at some length below. 
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1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PLIGHT OF THE WORKING MATHEMATICIAN 
Most writers on the subject seem to agree that the typical “working mathe- 
matician” is a Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sundays. That is, 
when he is doing mathematics, he is convinced that he is dealing with an 
objective reality whose properties he is attempting to determine. But then, 
when challenged to give a philosophical account of this reality, he finds it 
easiest to pretend that he does not believe in it after all. 
We quote two well-known authors: 
On foundations we believe in the reality of mathematics, but of course when 
philosophers attack us with their paradoxes we rush to hide behind formalism 
and say, “Mathematics is just a combination of meaningless symbols,” and then 
we bring out Chapters 1 and 2 on set theory. Finally we are left in peace to go 
back to our mathematics and do it as we have always done, with the feeling each 
mathematician has that he is working with something real. This sensation is 
probably an illusion, but is very convenient. That is Bourbaki’s attitude toward 
foundations. (Dieudonnt [8].) 
To the average mathematician who merely wants to know his work is securely 
based, the most appealing choice is to avoid difficulties by means of Hilbert’s 
program. Here one regards mathematics as a formal game and one is only 
concerned with the question of consistency . . . . The Realist position is probably 
the one which most mathematicians would prefer to take. It is not until he 
becomes aware of some of the difficulties in set theory that he would even 
begin to question it. If these difficulties particularly upset him, he will rush to the 
shelter of Formalism, while his normal position will be somewhere between the 
two, trying to enjoy the best of two worlds. (Cohen [4].) 
(Throughout the paper, the term “formalism” is used, as it is in these 
quotations from Dieudonnt and Cohen, to mean the philosophical position that 
much or all of pure mathematics is a meaningless game. It should be obvious 
that to reject formalism as a philosophy of mathematics by no means implies 
any critique of mathematical logic. On the contrary, logicians, whose own 
mathematical activity is the study of formal systems, are in the best position 
to appreciate the enormous difference between mathematics as it is done and 
mathematics as it is schematized in the notion of a formal mathematical system.) 
We will shortly offer an analysis of this supposed alternative of Platonism 
and formalism. At present we merely record this as a generally accepted fact 
about the mathematical world today: Most mathematicians live with two 
contradictory views on the nature and meaning of their work. Is it credible 
that this tension has no effect on the self-confidence and self-esteem of people 
who are supposed above all things to hate contradiction? 
The question of what is interesting in mathematics is a practical question 
of the highest importance for anyone who is active in research or who is involved 
in hiring and promoting people who do research. Is it not astonishing that there 
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is no public discussion on this question, no vehicle for public discussion of it, 
hardly even a language or viewpoint which could be used for such a discussion ? 
This is not to say that there can or should be explicit, agreed-upon standards 
of mathematical taste. On the contrary. Precisely because tastes differ, discussion 
on matters of taste is possible and necessary. Our very existence as a single 
profession, and our ability to agree in practice that certain deeds in mathe- 
matics are deserving the highest praise and reward, prove that there are common 
standards of excellence which we use as criteria for evaluating our work. To 
make these criteria explicit, to bring them into the open for discussion, challenge, 
and controversy, would be one important philosophical activity for mathe- 
maticians. Our inability to systain such a public discussion on values in mathe- 
matics is an aspect of philosophical unawareness and incompetence. 
The problems of truth and meaning are not technical issues in some recondite 
branch of logic or set theory. They confront anyone who uses or teaches mathe- 
matics. Tf we wish, we can ignore them. To do so, however, is to leave oneself 
the prisoner of one’s unexamined philosophical preconceptions. It would be 
surprising if this had no practical consequences. 
Let us pause to consider two possible examples of such practical consequences. 
The last half-century or so has seen the rise of formalism as the most frequently 
advocated point of view in mathematical phi1osophy.l In this same period, the 
dominant style of exposition in mathematical journals, and even in texts and 
treatises, has been to insist on precise details of definitions and proofs, but 
to exclude or minimize discussion of why a problem is interesting, or why a 
particular method of proof is used. 
It would be difficult or impossible to document the connection between 
formalism in expository style and formalism in philosophical attitude. Still, 
ideas have consequences. One’s conception of what mathematics is affects one’s 
conception of how it should be presented. One’s manner of presenting it is an 
indication of what one believes to be most essential in it. 
Another example is the importation, during the ‘60’s, of set-theoretic 
notation and axiomatics into the high-school curriculum. This was not an 
inexplicable aberration, as its critics sometimes seem to imagine. It was a 
predictable consequence of the philosophical doctrine that reduces all mathe- 
matics to axiomatic systems expressed in set-theoretic language. 
The criticism of formalism in the high schools has been primarily on pedagogic 
grounds: “This is the wrong thing to teach, or the wrong way to teach.” But all 
such arguments are inconclusive if they leave unquestioned the dogma that real 
mathematics is precisely formal derivations from formally stated axioms. If 
this philosophical dogma goes unchallenged, the critic of formalism in the 
schools appears to be advocating a compromise in quality: he is a sort of 
pedagogic opportunist, who wants to offer the student less than the “real thing.” 
l See, e.g., [S]. 
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The issue, then, is not, What is the best way to teach ? but, What is mathematics 
really all about? To discredit formalism in pedagogy, one must challenge its 
philosophical base: the formalist picture of the nature of mathematics. Con- 
troversies about high-school teaching cannot be resolved without confronting 
problems about the nature of mathematics. In the end, the critique of formalism 
can be successful only through the development of an alternative: a more 
convincing, more satisfactory philosophical account of the meaning and nature 
of mathematics2 
Mathematicians themselves seldom discuss the philosophical issues sur- 
rounding mathematics; they assume that someone else has taken care of this 
job. We leave it to the professionals. 
But the professional philosopher, with hardly any exception, has little to 
say to the professional mathematician. Indeed, he has only a remote and 
inadequate notion of what the professional mathematician is doing. Certainly 
this fact is not discreditable; it is to be expected, in view of the formidable 
technical prerequisites for understanding what we do. 
Still, it has to be said that if a mathematician, uncomfortable with his 
philosophical confusion, looks for help in the books and journals in his library, 
he will be badly disappointed. Some philosophers who write about mathematics 
seem unacquainted with any mathematics more advanced than arithmetic and 
elementary geometry. Others are specialists in logic or axiomatic set theory; 
their work seems as narrowly technical as that in any other mathematical 
specialty. 
There are professional philosophers of science who seem to be reasonably 
conversant with quantum mechanics and general relativity. There do not seem 
to be many professional philosophers who know functional analysis or algebraic 
topology or stochastic processes. Perhaps there is no need to know such things, 
if mathematics can really be reduced to logic or arithmetic or set theory. But 
such a presumption is itself a philosophical stand which is (to put it mildly) 
subject to challenge. 
There are a few penetrating comments on mathematics in Polanyi’s “Personal 
Knowledge.” But then, Polanyi was really a chemist. And there is the beautiful 
work “Proofs and Refutations” by I. M. Lakatos [17]. This dissertation, 
written under the influence of Karl Popper and George Polya, is the most 
interesting and original contribution to the philosophy of mathematics in recent 
decades. The fact that Lakatos’ work remains almost unknown to American 
mathematicians is a striking illustration of our intellectual blinders. 
There are, indeed, occasional philosophical comments by leading mathe- 
maticians whose interests are not confined to set theory and logic. But the 
art of philosophical discourse is not well developed today among mathematicians, 
even among the most brilliant. Philosophical issues just as much as mathe- 
2 These issues are developed by Thorn [26, 271 and Dieudonnk [lo]. 
REVIVING THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 35 
matical ones deserve careful argument, fully developed analysis, and due 
consideration of objections. A bald statement of one’s own opinion is not an 
argument, even in philosophy. 
In the usual university mathematics curriculum, the only philosophical 
questions considered are those raised by the various foundationist schools 
of 50 years ago. In regard to these, it is mentioned that none of them was able 
to carry out its program, and that there is no real prospect that any of them 
can resolve the problem of “foundations.” 
Thus, if we teach our students anything at all about the philosophical 
problems of mathematics, it is that there is only one problem of interest (the 
problem of the foundation of the real number system), and that problem seems 
totally intractable. 
Nevertheless, of course, we do not give up mathematics. We simply stop 
thinking about it. Just do it. That, more or less, is the present situation in the 
philosophy of mathematics. 
2. How DID WE GET HERE? 
This dilemma of Platonism versus formalism, of a vacillation between two 
unacceptable philosophies, is a characteristic of our own historical epoch. 
How did it come about? 
I would like to suggest a historical schema-a conjecture, which perhaps 
could be investigated by a suitably qualified historian. 
Even as an impressionistic conjecture, it may help give us an orientation 
on our present situation. 
Until well into the nineteenth century, geometry was regarded by everybody, 
including mathematicians, as the firmest, most reliable branch of knowledge. 
Analysis derived its meaning and its legitimacy from its link with geometry. 
I do not say “Euclidean geometry,” because the use of the qualifier became 
necessary and meaningful only after the possibility of more than one geometry 
had been recognized. Before that, geometry was simply geometry-the study 
of the properties of space. These existed absolutely and independently, were 
objectively given, and were the supreme example of properties of the universe 
which were exact, eternal, and knowable with certainty by the human mind. 
In the nineteenth century, several disasters took place. 
One disaster was the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, which showed 
that there was more than one thinkable geometry. 
A greater disaster was the development of analysis so that it overtook 
geometrical intuition. The discovery of space-filling curves and continuous 
nowhere-differentiable curves were stunning surprises which showed the 
vulnerability of the one solid foundation-geometric intuition-on which 
mathematics had been thought to rest. 
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The situation was intolerable because geometry had served, from the time 
of Plato, as the supreme exemplar of the possibility of certainty in human 
knowledge. Spinoza and Descartes followed the “more geometrico” in estab- 
lishing the existence of God, as Newton followed it in establishing his laws 
of motion and gravitation. The loss of certainty in geometry was philosophically 
intolerable, because it implied the loss of all certainty in human knowledge. 
The mathematicians of the nineteenth century, of course, proved equal to the 
challenge. Led by Dedekind and Weierstrass, they turned from geometry to 
arithmetic as the foundation for mathematics. 
Gradually it became clear that in reducing the continuum to arithmetic, 
one required a kind of mathematics which had hitherto gone unnoticed-set 
theory. 
Set theory at first seemed to be almost the same thing as logic, and so the 
hope then appeared that instead of arithmetic, set theory-logic could serve 
as the foundation for all mathematics. It was not to be. As Frege put it in his 
famous postscript, “Just as the building was completed, the foundation 
collapsed.” That is, Russell communicated to him the Russell paradox. 
This was the “crisis in foundations,” the central issue in the famous con- 
troversies of the first quarter of this century. Three principal remedies were 
proposed: 
The program of “logicism,” the school of Frege and Russell, was to find 
a reformulation of set theory, which could avoid the Russell paradox and 
thereby save the Frege-Russell-Whitehead program of establishing mathe- 
matics upon logic as a foundation. 
The work on this program played a major role in the development of logic. 
But it was a failure in terms of its original intention. By the time set theory 
had been patched up to exclude the paradoxes, it was a complicated structure 
which one could hardly identify with “logic” in the philosophical sense of 
“the rules for correct reasoning.” So it became untenable to argue that mathe- 
matics is nothing but logic-that mathematics is one vast tautology. 
I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith. 
I thought that certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than elsewhere. 
But I discovered that many mathematical demonstrations, which my teachers 
expected me to accept, were full of fallacies, and that, if certainty were indeed 
discoverable in mathematics, it would be in a new field of mathematics, with 
more solid foundations that those that had hitherto been thought secure. But as 
the work proceeded, I was continually reminded of the fable about the elephant 
and the tortoise. Having constructed an elephant upon which the mathematical 
world could rest, I found the elephant tottering, and proceeded to construct a 
tortoise to keep the elephant from falling. But the tortoise was no more secure 
then the elephant, and after some twenty years of very arduous toil, I came to the 
conclusion that there wa% nothing more that I could do in the way of making 
mathematical knowledge indubitable. (Bertrand Russell, “Portraits from 
Memory.“) 
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The response of Hilbert to this dilemma was the invention of “proof theory.” 
The idea was to regard mathematical proofs as sequences of formal symbols, 
rearranged and transformed according to certain rules which correspond 
to the rules of mathematical reasoning. Then purely finite, combinatorial 
arguments would be found to show that the axioms of set theory would never 
lead to a contradiction. In this way, mathematics would be given a secure 
foundation-in the sense of a guarantee of consistency. 
This kind of foundation is not at all the same as a foundation based on a 
theory known to be true, as geometry had been believed to be true, or at least 
impossible to doubt, as it is supposed to be impossible to doubt the law of 
contradiction in elementary logic. 
The formalist foundation, like the logicist foundation, tried to buy certainty 
and reliability at a price. As the logicist interpretation tried to make mathe- 
matics safe by turning it into a tautology, the formalist interpretation tried 
to make it safe by turning it into a meaningless game. The “proof-theoretic 
program” comes into action only after mathematics has been coded in a formal 
language and its proofs written in a way checkable by machine. As to the 
meaning of the symbols, that becomes something extra-mathematical. 
It is important to realize that Hilbert’s writings and conversation display 
full conviction that mathematical problems are questions about real objects, 
and have meaningful answers which are true in the same sense that any statement 
about reality is true. If he nevertheless was prepared to advocate a formalist 
interpretation of mathematics, this was the price he considered necessary for 
the sake of obtaining certainty. 
The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathe- 
matical methods... . The present state of affairs where we run up against the 
paradoxes is intolerable. Just think, the definitions and deductive methods which 
everyone learns, teaches and uses in mathematics, the paragon of truth and certi- 
tude, lead to absurdities! If mathematical thinking is defective, where are we to 
find truth and certitude ? (Hilbert [12].) 
As it happened, certainty was not to be had, even at this price. Godel’s 
incompleteness theorems showed that the Hilbert program was unattainable- 
that any formal system strong enough to contain elementary arithmetic would’ 
be unable to prove its own consistency. 
Instead of providing foundations for mathematics, Russell’s logic and 
Hilbert’s proof theory became the starting points for new branches of mathe- 
matics. Model theory and other branches of mathematical logic have become 
an intrinsic part of the whole structure of contemporary mathematics-and 
as much or as little in need of foundations as the rest of the structure. 
The third famous school that competed with the logicist and the formalist 
was the intuitionist. Brouwer’s position was that the natural numbers were 
reliable and needed no deeper foundation; and that the only acceptable parts 
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of mathematics were those that could be derived from the natural numbers 
“constructively.” His notion of constructivity was strict enough to exclude 
the real number system as it is usually understood. As a consequence, even 
though his opinions were accepted at least in part by such men as Hermann 
Weyl and Henri Poincare, the vast majority of mathematicians continued to 
work nonconstructively. 
(Some aspects of the intuitionist viewpoint are still attractive to mathe- 
maticians who are seeking an alternative to Platonism and formalism; in 
particular, the insistence that mathematics be meaningful, and that mathematics 
be viewed as a certain kind of human mental activity. One can accept these 
ideas, while rejecting the dogma that any mathematics which cannot be obtained 
“constructively” from the natural numbers is deficient in meaning.) 
This story is probably too long and familiar for many readers. But it makes 
the point: All three foundationist schools shared the same presupposition. 
For us today, in view of their common failure, the common presupposition is 
more important than the much-emphasized differences. By bringing out and 
challenging this presupposition, we can escape from the quagmire where 
mathematical philosophy has been trapped for f i f ty years. 
The common presupposition was that mathematics must be provided with 
an absolutely reliable foundation. The disagreement was on strategy, on what 
had to be sacrificed for the sake of the agreed-on goal. But the goal was never 
attained, and there are few who still hope for its attainment. 
At this point we can see the reason for the “working mathematician’s” 
uneasy oscillation between formalism and Platonism. Our inherited and 
unexamined philosophical dogma is that mathematical truth should possess 
absolute certainty. Our actual experience in mathematical work offers un- 
certainty in plenty. Platonism and formalism, each in its own way, provide 
a nonhuman “reality” where one might imagine absolute certainty dwells. 
Pick some familiar theorem: for example, the uncountability of the con- 
tinuum; Cauchy’s integral formula; the fundamental theorem of algebra. 
Is it a true statement about the world ? Does one discover such a theorem, 
and does such a discovery increase our knowledge? 
If you answer yes to such questions, you may be called a Platonist (or a 
“realist”). You will then be faced with the next question: to what objects 
or features of the world do such statements refer? One does not meet roots 
of polynomials (or uncountable sets) or integrals of analytic functions while 
walking down the street, or even while traveling in outer space. Where, outside 
of our thoughts, can one encounter roots of polynomials, or uncountable sets? 
Perhaps such things do not have any real existence after all, and the con- 
viction that they exist and are objectively knowable is merely an illusion in 
which we indulge ourselves. Perhaps a theorem is nothing more than a formula 
that can be derived by the rules of logic from some given set of formulas 
(axioms, if you will). 
REVIVING THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 39 
If you prefer to retreat to this modest disclaimer, you may be called a 
formalist. Since you have now renounced any claim that mathematics is 
meaningful, you are no longer under the difficulty of analyzing its meaning. 
But this does not leave you free from philosophical difficulties. On the contrary. 
You now may be asked, how is it that all three of the examples we have given 
were known, understood and used long before the axioms on which they are 
“based” had been stated? If we say that a theorem has no meaning except 
as a conclusion from axioms, then do we say that Gauss did not know the 
fundamental theorem of algebra, Cauchy did not know Cauchy’s integral 
formula, and Cantor did not know Cantor’s theorem? 
The basis for Platonism is the awareness we all have that the problems 
and concepts of mathematics exist independently of us as individuals. The 
zeroes of the zeta function are where they are, regardIess of what I may think 
or know on the subject. It is then easy for me to imagine that this objectivity 
is given outside of human consciousness as a whole, outside of history and 
culture. This is the myth of Platonism. It remains alive because it corresponds 
to something real in the daily experience of the mathematician. Yet it remains 
alive only as a halfhearted, shamefaced Platonism, because it is incompatible 
with the general philosophy or world-view of most scientists-including 
mathematicians.3 Platonism in the full sense--b&f in the existence of idea2 
entities, independent of or prior to human consciousness-is of course tenable 
within a religious world-view (belief in a divine Mind.) For those whose general 
world view excludes mysticism, Platonism in the full sense is very difficult 
to maintain once the full force of scientific skepticism is focused on it.4 
At this point the alternative becomes formalism. Instead of believing that 
our theorems are (or should be) truths about eternal extra-human ideals, 
we say instead that they are merely assertions about transformations of symbols 
(formal derivations). This viewpoint also involves an act of faith. How, indeed, 
do we Know that our latest theorem about diffusion on manifolds is formally 
deducible from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory? No such formal deduction 
s Two whole-hearted Platonists are R. Thorn (“Everything considered, mathematicians 
should have the courage of their most profound convictions and thus affirm that mathe- 
matical forms indeed have an existence that is independent of the mind considering 
them . . . . Yet, at any given moment, mathematicians have only an incomplete and 
fragmentary view of this world of ideas” [26].) and K. Godel (“Despite their remoteness 
from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set 
theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. 
I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., 
in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception . . . . They, too, may represent an 
aspect of objective reality” [II].). Thorn’s world of ideas is geometric, whereas Godel’s 
is the set-theoretic universe. 
4 “I cannot imagine that I shall ever return to the creed of the true Platonist, who sees 
the world of the actual infinite spread out before him and believes that he can comprehend 
the incomprehensible” (Robinson [22]). 
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is ever written down. If it were, and it were checked by a human reader, the 
likelihood of error would be greater than in checking an ordinary (not for- 
malized) mathematical proof. 
Platonism and formalism, each in its own way, falsify part of the reality 
of our daily experience. Thus we speak as formalists when we are compelled to 
face the mystical, antiscientific essence of Platonic idealism; we return to 
Platonism when we realize that formalism as a description of mathematics 
has only a distant resemblance to our actual knowledge of mathematics. 
The claim I wish to advance in this paper is that we can abandon them 
both, if we abandon the search for absolute certainty in mathematical truth. 
What we can have instead is a philosophy that is true to the reality of mathe- 
matical experience, at the price of violating some ancient philosophical 
dogmas. 
3. ANECDOTES AND GOSSIP 
Let us clear our minds by turning away from the philosophical alternatives 
we are accustomed to, and turning instead to our actual experience. 
Anyone who has ever been in the least interested in mathematics, or has 
even observed other people who were interested in it, is aware that mathe- 
matical work is work with ideas. Symbols are used as aids to thinking just 
as musical scores are used as aids to, music. The music comes first, the score 
comes later. Moreover, the score can never be a full embodiment of the musical 
thoughts of the composer. Just so, we know that a set of axioms and definitions 
is an attempt to describe the main properties of a mathematical idea. But 
there may always remain an aspect of the idea which we use implicitly, which 
we have not formalized because we have not yet seen the counterexample 
that would make us aware of the possibility of doubting it. 
The fact is that it is sometimes extraordinarily difficult to achieve under- 
standing, certainty, or clarity in mathematics. 
In every branch of contemporary mathematics, one hears a version of the 
following story (always by word of mouth, never in print). 
“Many of the most important theorems of our subject were first discovered 
by the great Professor Nameless. His intuition was so powerful that he was 
able to come to his conclusions by methods that no one else was able to under- 
stand. Years later, others were able to find proofs of his results by arguments 
that could be followed by all the workers in the field. Of course, it turned 
out that (with perhaps one or two exceptions) all of Nameless’ formulas and 
theorems were true. It was just that no one was quite able to follow his explana- 
tions of how he discovered them.” I am certainly not going to violate tradition 
by filling in the missing name. The same story is told by probabilists, by partial 
differential equators, by algebraists and by topologists-only the name of the 
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hero changes. This kind of knowledge bef ore complete proof is inexplicable 
in terms of the formalist account of mathematics. 
To give another instance-in an invited talk at an International Congress 
of Mathematicians, a famous professor describes some of his latest results. 
He adds that the correctness of these results is not quite certain, because there 
has not yet been time for other specialists in his area to check them, and of 
course, until you have checked with other people, you can never be quite 
sure you haven’t overlooked something. 
Even the greatest mathematicians make mistakes, sometimes important ones, 
and these may be found even in famous papers which have been well known for 
a long time. 
In the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, September 1963, 
there appeared an article entitled “False Lemmas in Herbrand,” by Dreben, 
Andrews, and Aanderaa. They showed that certain lemmas in a thesis published 
by Herbrand in 1929 are false. These lemmas are used in the proof of a theorem 
which has been well known and influential in logic for fifty years. The authors 
show how Herbrand’s theorem may be proved by replacing the false lemmas 
with correct ones.5 
In the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, March 1915, there 
appeared an article by S. Hellerstein and J. Williamson, entitled “Derivatives 
of Entire Functions and a Question of Polya.” They wrote: “In 1914, Pdlya 
asked: If an entire function f and all its derivatives have only real zeroes, is f 
in U,, ? (the Pblya-Laguerre class). In [I, 21 M. Alander proved that the answer 
to Polya’s question is affirmative for allfin U,, with p < 2 and in [3] purported 
to have extended this result to arbitrary p. However, in a famous survey article 
on zeros of successive derivatives, Polya refers to Alander’s papers [l] and [2] 
but not to his more general result [3]. The first author of this announcement, 
while a graduate student under the direction of A. Edrei, brought this curious 
omission to the latter’s attention. In response to Edrei’s subsequent query, 
Polya replied in a letter that he was aware of Alander’s more general “proof” 
but was never convinced by it nor could he show that it was fallacious! Alander’s 
proof involves a study of level curves of harmonic functions associated with 
functions in U,, . Avoiding such geometric considerations, and using instead 
direct analytic arguments, we have succeeded in proving a stronger version 
of Alander’s ‘theorem.’ ” 
Notice that both Alander’s and Herbrand’s theorems were true-even 
though their proofs were defective. This is the most typical case. Why is it so? 
A very interesting article by Philip Davis [6] contains, among other things, 
a discussion of errors in mathematical publications, with some famous names 
and examples. 
j I am indebted to Rohit Parikh for the information that for many years Herbrand’s 
thesis was not physically accessible to most logicians. Presumably his errors would have 
been corrected much sooner in normal circumstances. 
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Davis suggests that the length and interdependence of mathematical proof 
mean that truth in mathematics is probabilistic. I think his argument shows 
something else: that mathematical knowledge is fallible, and in this respect 
similar to other kinds of knowledge. 
Let us mean by “intuitive reasoning” or “informal reasoning” that reasoning 
in mathematics which depends on an implicit background of understanding, 
and which deals with concepts rather than symbols, as distinguished from 
calculation, which deals with symbols and can be mechanized. Then the 
checking of an analytic-algebraic proof, as actually done by a mathematician, 
is primarily a piece of intuitive reasoning. But there are many different kinds 
of intuitive reasoning. The proof that the angle sum of a Euclidean triangle 
equals two right angles can be written in a formal language and deduced using 
only modus ponens. To understand such a proof, the reader would have to 
supply a meaning to these statements-that is, he would have to reason 
intuitively. On the other hand, if the proof is given by drawing the familiar 
diagram, there is a different kind of intuition in which several steps of the 
symbolic proof are merged into a single insight. We have a choice, not between 
an intuitive fallible mode of reasoning and a formal, infallible mode, but between 
two modes of reasoning (verbal and diagrammatic) both of which are intuitive 
and fallible. (Parenthetical aside: The reasoning by words can be formalized, 
and this formalization itself can be studied for certain purposes. But it is entirely 
likely that the drawing of diagrams can also be formalized; see [7].) 
All this is not to deny the existence of an interpersonally verifiable notion 
of “correct proof” at the intuitive level of the working mathematician. It is 
merely to point out that this notion is not very similar to the model of 
formal proof in which correctness can always be verified as a mechanical 
procedure. 
We do not have absolute certainty in mathematics; we may have virtual 
certainty, just as in other areas of life. Mathematicians disagree, make mistakes 
and correct them, are uncertain whether a proof is correct or not. 
Faced with these obvious facts, one has three choices. The commonest 
is hypocrisy. That is, pretend not to notice the gap between preaching and 
practice. 
If we renounce hypocrisy, then we have to give up either the myth or the 
reality. Either say that mathematics as practiced every day by mathematicians 
is not what mathematics really ought to be, or else say that the theory, that 
mathematical proof is really ( or approximately or in principle) a mechanical 
procedure, is not quite right. 
A common response is to say, “True, we aren’t always as careful or thorough 
as we should be, but that doesn’t detract from the ideal.” 
In one sense this is unarguable. Certainly, we should try our best not to 
make mistakes. But if it is meant that we really ought to (if we only had the 
time and energy) write our proofs in a form that could be checked by a com- 
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puting machine, then the point is certainly arguable. Especially by anyone 
with experience debugging programs! 
It just is not the case that a doubtful proof would become certain by being 
formalized. On the contrary, the doubtfulness of the proof would then be 
replaced by the doubtfulness of the coding and programming. 
What really happens every day is that the correctness of a formal proof 
(i.e., of a code written for a computing machine) is checked by a human being 
who uses his understanding of the meaning of the steps of the computation to 
verify its formal correctness. 
As it has become commonplace to use very large, complicated programs, it 
has become recognized that it is essential to write these programs in a manner 
to be readable by human beings-that is, to be understandable, not just 
formally correct. True, we cannot give a formal definition of “understandable.” 
Nevertheless, it turns out in practice that it is understanding that ve$ies the 
correctness of formal computation-not only the other way round. 
4. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 was intended to make two points: 
(1) The unspoken assumption in all foundationist viewpoints is that 
mathematics must be a source of indubitable truth. 
(2) The actual experience of all schools-and the actual daily experience 
of mathematicians-shows that mathematical truth, like other kinds of truth, 
is fallible and corrigible. 
Do we really have to choose between a formalism that is falsified by our 
everyday experience, and a Platonism that postulates a mythical fairyland 
where the uncountable and the inaccessible lie waiting to be observed by the 
mathematician whom God blesses with a good enough intuition ? It is reasonable 
to propose a new task for mathematical philosophy: not to seek indubitable 
truth, but to give an account of mathematical knowledge as it really is- 
fallible, corrigible, tentative and evolving, as is every other kind of human 
knowledge. Instead of continuing to look in vain for foundations, or feeling 
disoriented and illegitimate for lack of foundations, we can try to look at what 
mathematics really is, and account for it as a part of human knowledge in 
general. That is, reflect honestly on what we do when we use, teach, invent, 
or discover mathematics-by studying history, by introspection, and by 
observing ourselves and each other with the unbiased eye of Martians or 
anthropologists. 
Such a program requires a philosophical position which is radically different 
from the three classical points of view (formalist, Platonist, intuitionist). The 
position I will try to present differs from all three of them in the following 
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sense. It denies the right of any a priori philosophical dogma to tell mathe- 
maticians what they should do, or what they really are doing in spite of them- 
selves or without knowing it. Rather, it takes as its starting point the attitude 
that mathematics, as it is being done now and as it has evolved in history, 
is a reality which does not require justification or reinterpretation. What has 
to be done in the philosophy of mathematics is to explicate (from the outside, 
as part of general human culture, rather than from the inside, within mathe- 
matical terms) what mathematicians are doing. If this attempt is successful, 
the result will be a description of mathematics which mathematicians will 
recognize as true. It will be the kind of truth that is obvious once it is said, 
but up to then was perhaps too obvious for anyone to bother saying. 
There is a comparison with the philosophy of science. At one time philosophers 
of science wrote elaborate rules of inductive discovery which scientists were 
supposed to follow. The fact that one could hardly find a scientist who had 
made a discovery in such a fashion seemed quite irrelevant to them. More 
recently, K. Popper and M. Polanyi have described science in a different 
manner, more closely related to a real knowledge of how science develops, 
and not so much based on the traditional philosophizing of Francis Bacon 
or John Stuart Mill. These writings of Popper and Polanyi are not completely 
ignored by practicing scientists. On the contrary, some scientists have testified 
that their work has benefited by the insights they received from these works 
on the philosophy of science. 
We can try to describe mathematics, not as our inherited prejudices imagine 
it to be, but as our actual experience tells us it is. Certainly our experience 
does not tell us that it is a game with symbols (formalism) nor that it is a direct 
perception of ideal entities (Platonic idealism). 
What would be the most straightforward, natural answer to the question, 
what is mathematics ? 
It would be that mathematics deals with ideas. Not pencil marks or chalk 
marks, not physical triangles or physical sets, but ideas (which may be repre- 
sented or suggested by physical objects). What are the main properties of 
mathematical activity or mathematical knowledge, as known to all of us from 
daily experience ? 
(1) Mathematical objects are invented or created by humans. 
(2) They are created, not arbitrarily, but arise from activity with already 
existing mathematical objects, and from the needs of science and daily life. 
(3) Once created, mathematical objects have properties which are well- 
determined, which we may have great difficulty in discovering, but which are 
possessed independently of our knowledge of them. (For example, I define a 
function as the solution of a certain boundary-value problem. Then the value 
of the function at some interior point is determined, although I may have no 
effective way of finding it out.) 
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These three points are not philosophical theses which have to be established. 
They are facts of experience which have to be understood. What has to be done 
is to analyze their paradoxes, and to examine their philosophical consequences. 
To say that mathematical objects are invented or created by humans is to 
distinguish them from natural objects such as rocks, X rays, or dinosaurs. 
Recently, certain philosophers (Korner, Putnam) have argued that the 
subject matter of pure mathematics is the physical world-not its actualities 
but its possibilities. To exist in mathematics, they propose, means to exist 
potentiuZZy in the physical world. This view has the merit that it does permit 
us to say that mathematical statements have meaning, can be true or false. 
It has the defect, however, that it attempts to explain the clear by means of 
the obscure. Consider the theorem 2” < 2c2’), or any theorem in homological 
algebra. No philosopher has yet explained in what sense such theorems should 
be regarded as referring to physical “possibilities.” 
The common sense standpoint of the working mathematician is that the 
objects of algebra, say, or of set theory, are just that-part of a theory. They 
are human ideas, of recent invention. They are not timelessly or tenselessly 
existing either as Platonic ideas or as latent potentialities in the physical world. 
We may ask how these objects, which are our own creations, so often turn 
out to be useful in describing aspects of nature. To answer this specifically 
in detail is important and complicated. It is one of the major tasks for the 
history of mathematics, and for a psychology of mathematical cognition which 
may be coming into birth in the work of Piaget and his school. The answer in 
general, however, is easy and obvious. Human beings live in the world and 
all their ideas ultimately come from the world in which they live-refracted 
through their culture and history, which are in turn, of course, ultimately 
rooted in man’s biological nature and his physical surroundings. Our mathe- 
matical ideas fit the world for the same reason that our lungs are suited to the 
atmosphere of this planet.6 
Once created and communicated, mathematical objects are there. They 
become part of human culture, separate from their originator. As such, they 
are now objects, in the sense that they have well-determined properties of 
their own, which we may or may not be able to discover. 
If this sounds paradoxical, it is because of a habit of thinking which sees 
in the world only two kinds of reality: the individual subject (the isolated ego) 
on the one hand, and the exterior world of nature on the other. 
The existence of mathematics is enough to show the inadequacy of such 
a world view. The customs, traditions, and institutions of our society-all 
our nonmaterial culture-are aspects of the world which are neither in the 
B “I have met people who found it astonishing that the cats have holes in their furs 
exactly at the places where the eyes are.” (I am indebted to Wilhelm Magnus for this 
quotation from “Lichtenberg, an i&h-century professor of physics at GGttingen.“) 
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private “inner” nor the nonhuman “outer” world.’ Mathematics is also this 
third kind of reality-a reality that is “inner” from the viewpoint of society 
as a whole, yet “outer” from the viewpoint of each individual member of 
society. 
That mathematical objects have properties which are well determined is 
as familiar as the fact that mathematical problems often have well-determined 
answers. 
To explain more fully how this comes about is again a matter for actual 
investigation, not speculation. The rough outlines, however, are visible to 
anyone who has studied and taught mathematics. 
To have the idea of counting, one needs the experience of handling coins 
or blocks or pebbles. To have the idea of an angle, one needs the experience 
of drawing straight lines that cross, on paper or in a sandbox. Later on, mental 
pictures or sample calculations prepare the ground for other new c0ncepts.s 
A suitable shared experience of activity-first physical manipulation, later on, 
paper and pencil calculation-creates a common effect. 
Of course, not everyone experiences the desired result. The student who 
never catches on to how we want him to handle the parentheses in our algebraic 
expression simply doesn’t pass the course. 
Why are we able to talk to each other about algebra ? We have been trained to 
do so, by a training that has been evolved for that purpose. We can do this without 
being able to verbalize a formal definition of polynomials. Polynomials are 
objective, in the sense that they have certain properties, whether we know 
them or not. That is to say, our common notion has implicit properties. To 
unravel how this is so is a deep problem comparable to the problem of 
linguistics. No one understands clearly how it is that languages have mysterious, 
complicated properties unknown to the speakers of the language. Still, no 
one doubts that the locus of these properties is in the culture of the language 
speaker-not in the external world nor in an ideal other world. The properties 
of mathematical objects, too, are properties of shared ideas. 
The observable reality of mathematics is this: we see an evolving network 
of shared ideas which have objective properties; these properties are ascertained 
’ Related ideas are advocated by Popper [20] and especially by White [28]. They are 
implicit in the well-known writings of R. L. Wilder on mathematics as a cultural phenom- 
enon. In a different sense, they are also implicit in the writings on “heuristic” of George 
Polya and their philosophical elaboration by Imre Lakatos. 
8 The work of Piaget [19] is little read by professional mathematicians, perhaps in part 
because some of his comments on groups and other abstract mathematical structures 
seem naive or misinformed. Nevertheless, one cannot overestimate the importance of 
his central insight: that mathematical intuitions are not absorbed from nature by passive 
observation, but rather are created by the experience of active manipulation of objects 
and symbols. The full import of this insight for mathematical epistemology has yet to be 
appreciated. 
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by many kinds of reasoning and argument. These kinds of valid reasonings, 
which are called “proofs,” are not universal; they differ from one branch of 
mathematics to another, and from one historical epoch to another. 
Looking at this fact of human experience, there certainly is matter for 
explication. 
How are mathematical objects invented ? 
What is the interplay of existing mathematics, ideas and needs from other 
branches of science, and direct mirroring of physical reality? 
How does the notion of proof develop, becoming more refined and subtle 
as new dangers and sources of error are discovered ?s 
Does the network of mathematical ideas and reasoning, as part of our shared 
consciousness, have an integrity as a whole that is more than the strength 
of any one link in the reasoning, so that the collapse of any one part can affect 
only those parts closest to it? 
These sorts of philosophical questions can be studied by the historian of 
mathematics-if we allow, as we should, his field of study to extend up to 
yesterday and today. The famous work of Thomas Kuhn is a paradigm of the 
kind of insight in the philosophy of science that is possible only on the basis 
of historical studies. Such work has yet to be done in the philosophy and history 
of mathematics.lO 
Such studies will never make mathematical truth indubitable. But then, 
why should mathematical truth be indubitable? 
In daily life, we well know that our knowledge is subject to correction, is 
partial and incomplete. In the natural sciences, it is accepted that scientific 
progress consists of enlarging, correcting, and sometimes even rejecting and 
replacing the knowledge of the past. It is the possibility of correcting errors 
by confronting them with experience that characterizes scientific knowledge. 
This is precisely the reason why it is essential that we share our ideas and 
check each other’s work. 
This account of mathematics contains nothing new. It is merely an attempt 
9 “Historically speaking, it is of course quite untrue that mathematics is free from 
contradiction; non-contradiction appears as a goal to be achieved, not as a God-given 
quality that has been granted us once for all . . . . There is no sharply drawn line between 
those contradictions which occur in the daily work of every mathematician, beginner or 
master of his craft, as the result of more or less easily detected mistakes, and the major 
paradoxes which provide food for logical thought for decades and sometimes centuries.” 
(N. Bourbaki, “Foundations of Mathematics for the Working Mathematician,” J. Symbolic 
Logic 14 (1949), l-8.) 
lo “Under the present dominance of formalism, one is tempted to paraphrase Kant: 
the history of mathematics, lacking the guidance of philosophy, has become blind, while 
the philosophy of mathematics, turning its back on the most intriguing phenomena in 
the history of mathematics, has become empty” (Lakatos [lq). However, recent work 
in the history of mathematics shows an increasing interest in philosophical issues. See, 
for example, the articles on historiography in Historia Mathematics 2 (November 1975). 
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to describe what mathematicians actually are doing and have been doing for 
centuries. 
The novelty, if any, is the conscious attempt to avoid falsification or idealiza- 
tion. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The alternative of Platonism and formalism comes from the attempt to 
root mathematics in some nonhuman reality. If we give up the obligation 
to establish mathematics as a source of indubitable truths, we can accept its 
nature as a certain kind of human mental activity. 
In doing this, we give up some age-old hopes; we may gain a clearer idea 
of what we are doing, and why. 
Could it be that in mathematics too we need a new Consciousness ? . . . A new 
consciousness stressing the exchange, communication and experience of mathe- 
matical information, a Consciousness where mathematics is told in human words 
rather than in a mass of symbols, intelligible only to the initiated; a Conscious- 
ness where mathematics is experienced as an enlightening intellectual activity 
rather than an almost fully automated logical robot, ardently performing 
simultaneously a large number of seemingly unrelated tasks. (P. Henrici, Quart. 
Appl. Math. (April 1972), 38.) 
A world of ideas exists, created by human beings, existing in their shared 
consciousness. These ideas have properties which are objectively theirs, in 
the same sense that material objects have their own properties. The construction 
of proof and counterexample is the method of discovering the properties of 
these ideas. This is the branch of knowledge which we call mathematics. 
COMMENTS ON THE BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The present article is strongly influenced by Lakatos’ critique of formalism 
presented in the first few pages of [17] and accepts his aim [15] “to exhibit 
modern mathematical philosophy as deeply embedded in general epistemology 
and as only to be understood in this context.” 
No attempt is made here to discuss in detail the issues raised by intuitionism 
and constructivism. These were presented by Bishop, Stolzenberg, and Kopell 
at a symposium published in Historiu Mathematicu 2 (November 1975). The 
spokesmen for the “classical” viewpoint at that symposium were remarkably 
unwilling to deal with the philosophical issues raised by Bishop. A conscientious 
evaluation of intuitionism from the classical point of view has been given by a 
physicist; see Bunge [3]. 
A “Platonist” viewpoint is espoused by Steiner [25], and a formalist one by 
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DieudonnC [8]. Monk [18], Cohen [4], and Robinson [22] discuss the Platonist- 
formalist duality in the light of Cohen’s results on independence of the con- 
tinuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice, Putnam’s “modal-logic” version 
of realism is presented in his recent book [21]. 
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